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Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act:
Four Years of Procedural Elucidation
Francis T. Coleman*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has recently celebrated its
fifth anniversary.' While it is difficult at this point to assess the long-
range impact which this controversial piece of civil rights legislation
will have on employment and personnel policies throughout the
country, 2 it can be safely stated that the Act has thus far created a field
day for the nation's lawyers. Perforce, both they and the judiciary have
become fellow travelers along the tortuous paths which lead to ultimate
enforcement of the Act's substantive guarantees.
Title VII, was the first attempt to secure comprehensive guarantees
of equal employment opportunity at the national level. Its passage,
over well-organized and powerful opposition, was accomplished after
what has been rightly termed "an epic legislative struggle"3 and the
legislative product that emerged provides a classic example of Con-
gressional compromise. 4
. LL.B., Georgetown University.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 (e) to 2000(e)-15 (1964). Title
VII, as amended, was signed into law on July 2, 1964. Its effective date of enforcement,
however, did not commence until one year later. (Sec. 716(a)).
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in its Third Annual Report,
submitted to Congress, April 22, 1969, emphasized statistically the progress that has been
made since the Act's inception, concluding that "Fiscal 1968 was the year in which the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission began to realize its full potential under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as guarantor of job equality for minorities and
women. (Report of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for fiscal year ending
June 30, 1968, transmitted to the House of Representatives April 22, 1969.) The Report,
however, candidly acknowledged that there can be no doubt how much remains to be
accomplished before "race, color, religion, sex and national origin become the irrele-
vancies they deserve to be when Americans are seeking or holding a job."
3. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History. 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966). In this
article, the author provides an excellent blow by blow account of what has been aptly
described as "Title VII's torrid conception, its turbulent gestation and its frenzied birth."
Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F. 2d 283 (5th cir. 1969).
4. Indeed, the resulting deadlock required the use of cloture for only the second time
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Predictably, reaction to the new legislation was mixed. Many com-
mentators registered sharp criticism at what they felt was the statute's
glaring failure to provide adequate methods of enforcing the law's non-
discrimination assurances. 5 Others were more optimistic, believing
that the voluntary processes of mediation and conciliation which the
Act fostered, would, if given a chance, prove successful. 6 There was
general agreement, however, that the key to the success or failure of
law would in the end analysis depend primarily on the procedural
means by which the statute's protections were to be made available.7
It was recognized that the Act's substantive guarantees would soon
become meaningless, unless the victims of employment discrimination
could secure meaningful and effective remedial relief. Without the
availability of such remedial action, persistent violators would be un-
deterred and others would have no incentive to seek voluntary com-
pliance, other than moral suasion, the ineffectiveness of which had been
manifested over the years. In short, this was the prevailing preliminary
evaluation of Title VII and the ensuing years have only confirmed
the wisdom of this diagnosis.
Title VII has been termed somewhat less than a model of legal
draftsmanship. Nowhere is this indictment more deserved than in the
sections dealing with the procedures preliminary to court enforcement.
The statute's unique system of public/private enforcement, a product
of the Act's negotiated inception, helps to explain the numerous un-
in the Senate's history to cut off debate. Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, supra. note 3
at 446; M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, 62 (1966).
For a general discussion of Title VII's legislative history see: BNA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964: Text, Analysis, Legislative History (1964). See also, Comment, Enforcement of
Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430 (1965);
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 62, 64-68 (1964).
5. Cooksey, The Role Of Law In Equal Employment Opportunity 7 B.C. IND. & COM.
417 (1966); Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. 459 (1966);
Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. 473 (1966). Sovern,
supra note 4.; Berg, supra note 4.
6. Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Reme-
dies, 7 B.C. IND. & Co,. L. REV. 495 (1966). Comment: Enforcement of Fair Employment
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 4; Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 510 (1968). Cf. Winter,
Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A
Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1967). While reserving judgment on
Title VII generally, Professor Winter does comment that the conciliation process favored
by the statute is a realistic and forward looking attempt at eliminating employment
discrimination.
7. Sovern, supra note 4. The author expressed scepticism over the effectiveness of the
statute as it pertains to private enforcement, noting that, but for vigorous and frequent
intervention of the Attorney General under Sections 707 and 706(e), the hope held out by
the law could turn out to a "serious disappointment." See also, Walker, supra, note 6;
McLaughlin, Jobs, Workers and the Civil Rights Act, LAW NOTES, July 1966.
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certainties surrounding enforcement of the law's substantive guarantees.
Such explanations, however, have provided small consolation to indi-
viduals attempting to make the law work for them.
The past four years have found the federal courts struggling manfully
to provide answers to the nagging procedural problems left in the
aftermath of the Act's "frenzied birth." In the process, litigants were to
learn that, as has so often been the case with complex statutory machin-
ery, the law's procedural aspects are often paramount to the substantive
provisions to which they are the threshold.
Before examining in detail the procedural framework through which
a complaining party must seek relief under the Act, however, it might
be helpful to outline briefly Title VII 's substantive coverage and to
summarize generally the Act's regulatory scheme.
I. TITLE VII-SUBSTANTIVE PROHIBITIONS
AND ENFORCEMENT IN GENERAL
Broadly speaking, Title VII makes it an unfair employment practice
for employers, labor organizations and employment agencies to engage
in discrimination with respect to practically every facet of the employer-
employee relationship with which they respectively come into contact
-when such discrimination is based on race, religion, color, sex or
national origin. The statute does allow for certain exclusions and
exceptions but they are for the most part limited and do not materially
detract from the statute's overall comprehensiveness." In general, there-
fore, Title VII's coverage is broad enough to reach practically every
type of discrimination, which, over the years has served as a barrier to
full integration of minority groups into the American working force.
In order to effectuate this legislative policy of non-discrimination,
Title VII establishes a five-member body, known as the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as the EEOC).
This Commission is charged with the responsibility of receiving and
investigating complaints filed by "aggrieved persons" and attempting,
8. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications 7 B.C. IND. & CoN,. L. REV. 473
(1966); Sovern, supra note 4; Berg, supra note 4, at 62; Kheel, The Impact of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT No. 16, Jan. 26, 1965, at E.1.
Cf. Benewitz, Coverage Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 17 LAB. L.J. 285 (May,
1966). Probably most signicant of Title VII's limitations is the fact that, it does not cover
employers of 24 or fewer employees. This limitation, coupled with the other areas ex-
cluded from the Act's coverage, have received decidedly vocal criticism from those who
felt that Title VII in its final form had been emasculated to the point where comprehen-
sive relief was unavailable. See, Schmidt, supra note 5.
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by methods of "conference and conciliation and persuasion" to elimi-
nate alleged unlawful employment practices whenever it determines
that there is "reasonable cause" to believe that violations of the Act
have occurred.9 Members of the Commission are also empowered to
initiate unfair employment charges whenever they have reason to
believe that the Act has been violated.10 If, after a finding of reasonable
cause, attempts by the Commission at conciliation prove fruitless, en-
forcement is returned to the hands of the aggrieved party or parties,
who are then obliged to file civil suit within a specified time period,
or risk forfeiture of their legal remedies.
In addition to suits filed by private "aggrieved parties," Title VII
also authorizes the Attorney General to file suit whenever he has
"reasonable cause to believe that any person or groups of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance" to the full enjoyment
of rights protected by the Act." Section 706(e) of the Act also permits
the Attorney General to intervene in private civil actions whenever
he certifies that the case is of general public importance.
Basically, therefore, the statute envisions three primary methods
for enforcement: 1) conciliation by the Commission after a finding
of reasonable cause 2) judicial enforcement through private civil
actions once conciliation has failed or 3) judicial enforcement through
"pattern and practice" suits brought by the Attorney General.
1I. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES FOR
RELIEF UNDER TITLE VII
The foregoing synopsis might suggest that filing a complaint with
the Commission, having it thereafter processed, and ultimately obtain-
ing relief, either through private settlement or judicial order, is a
rather simple and straightforward process. The voluminous litigation
that has thus far engulfed the U.S. District Courts and the Federal
Courts of Appeal offers dramatic refutation of any such an assumption.
Practically every aspect of the statute addressed to pre-litigation pro-
cedures has at one time or another been the subject of a lawsuit.12
9. Section 706(a).
10. Id.
11. Section 707(a). Many authors expressed high expectations that Attorney General
suits under section 707, since self initiating, could serve to compensate for the inadequa-
cies associated with private enforcement under the Act. Sovern, supra note 4, at 80, 102;
Berg, supra note 4.
12. See, Remarks of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in a speech delivered to Lawyers Seminar on Title VII (Jan. 10, 1969);
Vol. 8: 1, 1969-1970
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Those sections which have as yet to receive the benefit of the judicial
interpretation, need only wait their turn.
13
'As a result of this floodgate of litigation, many of the Title VII
procedural issues that had initially been the subject of divergent legal
thinking have now crystalized to the point where their disposition
may be considered settled. Other troublespots, however, still remain.
This paper will attempt to highlight both categories.
A. Unlawful Employment Practice Charges
a) The Necessity of Filing Charges Before the EEOC. Naturally,
one of the first questions concerning the new legislation was whether
an aggrieved party had to file a charge with the EEOC and comply
with the other procedural requirements of Section 706 before he
obtained the right to seek judicial relief. Certain remarks made during
the Congressional debate tended to indicate that a complainant could
file suit at any time, whether or not he had first exhausted the EEOC's
services.1 4 This position, however, was seemingly at odds with the entire
thrust of the statute, which accentuated voluntary settlement of equal
employment disputes through the offices of the Commission.1 5 Thus
far, it has been rejected and the Courts have held, almost without
exception, that at least in the case of individual suits, the filing of a
charge with the EEOC is a necessary prerequisite to subsequent court
enforcement.1 6 Applying this principle, private suits have been con-
CCH Employ-Practices - New Developments, 8082. As an index to the volume of Title
VII litigation, between June 1968 and June 1969, more than 140 court decisions applying
the statute were issued, most of them involving resolution of procedural questions. Equal
Employment Opportunity Law - Practice and Procedure, Committee Report, ABA (Sec-
tion of Labor Relations Law, 1969 at 166).
13. Id. See also, comments contained in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp. 400 F.2d 28 (5th
Circuit 1968), wherein the Court lists the Title VII litigation pending before it. 400 F.2d
at 29, n.l.
14. Senator Humphrey stated during the Senate Debate that: "The individual may
proceed in his own right at any time. He may take his complaint to the Commission; he
may bypass the Commission, or he may go directly to Court." 110 CONG. REC. 14188
(1964). See also remarks of Senator Javits, ibid p. 14191 and Rep. Cellar, Hearings before
the House Committee on Rules in H. Res. 789, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1964). See also,
Walker, supra note 6.Cf. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn., 1966).
Contra, statements of Senators Irvin and Cannon, 110 CONG. REc. 14188 (1964).
15. See Berg, Title VII, A Three-Years' View, 44 NoTRE DAmE LAwYER 311, 314 (Feb.
1969). BNA, supra note 4, at 46. Sovern, supra note 4, at 83.
16. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insur. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968); Mondy v. Crown Zellerback Corp. 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La.
1967); Samuel v. T.E. Wannamaker, Inc. 70 L.R.R.M. 2637 (D.S.C. 1968); Eleuterio v.
Conley 69 L.R.R.M. 2001 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp.
291 F. Supp. 199, (C.D. Calif. 1968); Watts v. Douglas Aircraft Co. 70 L.R.R.M. 2907
(C.D. Calif. 1968); ILA, Local 329 v. South Atlantic Gulf Coast Dist., 295 F. Supp. 299 (C.D.
Tex. 1968). See also, Barrister v. Stineberg et al., 56 CCH Lab. Cas. 9071 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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sistently dismissed against defendants who were not named as respond-
ents in charges filed with the EEOC.'7 In the same vein, a recent
Federal District Court has ruled that a plaintiff cannot circumvent the
Commission's procedures by resort to direct Court action based on the
Civil Rights Act of 1870.18 As a result of these decisions, the time,
place and formality with which unfair employment practice charges
must be filed, becomes a matter of critical importance
b) Timeliness-When Must Charges Be Filed. Section 706(d) pro-
vides that unlawful employment practice charges "shall be filed within
ninety days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." In cases
where the alleged unfair labor practice also falls within the jurisdiction
of certain state laws of equal employment opportunity, this statutory
limitation period is extended to two hundred and ten days following
the occurrence of the alleged discrimination, or thirty days after the
state or local authority has concluded its action on the matter, which-
ever comes first. 19 For the most part, the Courts have regarded these
time limitations as mandatory in nature, with strict compliance neces-
sary to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction.2 0 However, at least one
court has adopted the position that failure to file within the statutory
period will not bar subsequent legal action, at least where extenuating
circumstances are present. 21
17. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 2 F.E.P. 121 (7th Cir., Sept. 26 1969). Mickel v.
South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 877 (1967); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co. 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968); Samuel v.
T.E. Wannamaker, Inc. 70 L.R.R.M. 2637 (D.S.C. 1968); Moody v; Albemarle Paper Co., 271
F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
18. Harrison v. American Can Company, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Ala. August, 1969).
The Court reasoned that Congress in enacting Title VII, which sets forth a comprehensive
scheme for handling employment discrimination cases, clearly intended that
a person charging discriminating employment practices covered by Title VII should
first, and promptly, invoke the [its] administrative process, and must give that process,
including any applicable state and local equal employment laws, a reasonable oppor-
tunity to resolve the charge.
The Court declined to rule whether an employee who first unsuccessfully proceeds under
Title VII, may later file suit under the 1870 Act. Cf. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19. Sections 706(e) and 706(b).
20. Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Cox v. United
States Gypsum Co. 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Fore v. So. Bell Tel. Co. 293 F. Supp. 587
(W.D.N.C. 1968); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co. 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
Banks v. Local Union 136, IBEW, 296 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Hutchings v. United
States Industries, Inc. 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9260 (E.D. Tex. 1969); Love v. Pullman Co. -
F. Supp. -, 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 6517 (D.C. Colo. 1969); Contra, Hayes v. Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad, 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
21. Antanopulos v. Aerojet General Corp. 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Calif. 1968); cf Cox v.
United States Gypsum, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969). In Antanopulos, the court stated, at
1395:
filing a charge with the EEOC within ninety days of a discriminatory layoff is not an
absolute prerequisite to filing suit based on that layoff where there are extenuating
circumstances justifying the delay in filing the charge.
Vol. 8: 1, 1969-1970
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The most vexing problem in connection with Title VII's limitation
period concerns the establishment of the precise time when the time
period begins to run. In this regard, most courts have followed the
distinction utilized by the National Labor Relations Board in ques-
tions of this nature, i.e., distinguishing between discriminatory acts
which are said to be single transactions, complete in themselves and
those construed to be of a continuing nature. In the former instances,
the statute begins to run from the date of the discrimination's occur-
rence, while in the latter, the time does not run until the continuing
aspect of the violation has ceased.
Most of the acts of discrimination alleged under Title VII fall into
the single act category. Included among these have been discriminatory
refusals to hire, discharges, layoffs, transfers and promotions.2 2 On the
other hand, class action suits, alleging a pattern of discrimination
common to an entire group of employees, have been held to charge
violations of a continuing nature, and therefore not subject to dis-
missal for lack of timeliness.2 3 It is worth noting also, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has recently indicated that an allegation of discriminatory applica-
tion of recall rights may be implicit in a charge claiming unlawful
lay-off, especially where there has been an assertion that the violation
is continual in nature.2 4 Hence, under appropriate circumstances, this
Court of Appeals concluded that the countdown will begin not from
the initial lay-off date, but from the time the employee would have
been recalled but for the discrimination.2 5 Where the act complained
of is the single transaction variety, however, the mere fact that the
22. The Commission's General Counsel has ruled that transfers, layoffs and discon-
tinuances of work assignments are not continuing acts, and therefore charges alleging
such matters must be filed within ninety days of the discrimination's occurrence. (Opin-
ions of General Counsel, Nov. 26, Dec. 2, 1965, and January 11, 1966, (CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRAcrjcis GutmE, 17, 252.304). See also, Gardner, The Procedural Steps of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 ALABAMA LAWYER 80, 88 (1968).
23. Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co. 68 L.R.R.M. 2696 (N.D. Ga. 1968), cf. Cox v. United
States Gypsum, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
24. Cox. v. United States Gypsum, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
25. The reasons cited by the Court for its conclusion under the facts presented were:
(1) A layoff, as distinguished from discharge or quitting, suggests a possibility of re-
employment. (2) A layman's claim of "continuing" discrimination, after a discrimina-
tory layoff, readily suggests that he claims there has been subsequent recall or new
hiring which discriminates against him. (3) The record shows that the company had
bound itself, by its collective bargaining agreement, to consider seniority in making
a recall, and the agreement provides that an employee does not lose seniority by
reason of layoff until one year has expired. (4) The Commission chose to accept these
charges as timely. (5) The company receives notices of other charges of similar current
discrimination at or about the same time.
This court, as have many others, also indicated that the EEOC's decision to process the
charge, was an important consideration in their determination as to its legal sufficiency.
(409 F.2d at 290).
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respondent fails to take corrective action, does not thereby convert
the discrimination into an abiding offense.26
Another question that has arisen in connection with 706(e)'s time
limitations is whether resort to contract grievance procedures or other
remedies suspends the statutory deadlines. Resolution of this question,
however, has posed little difficulty, with the courts holding that the
availability of remedies other than those provided by Title VII in no
way diminishes the necessity for the charging party to comply with
the statutory requirements of the Act.
27
c) Deference to State and Local Law. Sections 706(b) and (c) require
the EEOC to defer to state fair employment remedies, both with
respect to individuals and commissioner charges, whenever the alleged
discrimination occurs in a state or a political subdivision thereof which
has a law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and
authorizes it to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto.28 Thus, the Commission is
not required to defer to all states having machinery for dealing with
discriminatory employment practices, but only those having laws
providing for meaningful enforcement.2 9
The Commission has adopted the following policy with regard to
deferrals to appropriate state or local agencies under 706(b). When
charges are received which may be cognizable under Title VII, the
Commission forwards a copy to the appropriate state or local authority
and informs the aggrieved party that unless notified to the contrary,
the EEOC will consider the charges refiled with it upon completion of
the state or local proceedings, or when sixty days have passed, which-
26. Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc. - F. Supp. - , 60 CCH Lab. Cas.
9260 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
27. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co. 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968); United States
v. Georgia Power Co. et al. 301 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (Attorney General's Suit);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967). Dent v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp.
905 (N.D. Ga. 1967). cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
28. Section 706(b).
29. See General Counsel opinions 12/2/65, 12/6/65, 12/8/65 and Opin. Ltr. GC Opin.
665-67. The Commission's interpretation and application of 706(b), whereby it refuses to
defer to states whose equal employment laws lack adequate enforcement power, has
recently received judicial approval. Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. 71
L.R.R.M. 2705 (D.C. Ariz. August, 1969). In reaching this result, the Court commented
that "it would run counter to the Congressional purposes embodied in the Act to require
a charging party to pursue a remedy before a state agency which lacks the power to grant
relief from the alleged violation .... [The] legislative history clearly indicating "that
charges be filed with or referred to only those state agencies that grant relief com-
parable to that available under Title VII. At present, 33 states and the District of Columbia
have statutes to which the Commission holds it must defer.
Vol. 8: 1, 1969-1970
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ever occurs first. This sixty-day period is deemed to commence on the
date indicated on the return receipt. Where the state or local agency's
proceedings terminate prior to sixty days thereafter, the date that the
complainant is notified of the termination is deemed the date on which
the charges are filed with the Commission. Where the charges are
originally filed with the Commission more than one hundred and fifty
days after the alleged act of discrimination, the Commission follows
the foregoing procedures, except that in any event, the charges are
considered as being filed no later than the two hundred and ninth day
after the discriminatory act, thereby preventing the tolling of the
statute.3 0
Thus, EEOC regulations provide for the transfer of the charges to
the appropriate state and local agencies and their automatic filing with
the Commission, following an opportunity for the state or local body
to dispose of the matter. EEOC regulations also call for reciprocal
cooperation on the part of state and local agencies, with such agencies
being required to notify the Commission of all complaints received
which fall outside the limits of their jurisdiction. In spite of this
general policy of mutual cooperation, however, the Commission refuses
to recognize settlements authorized by a state or local agency as binding
on it, unless the aggrieved party has in writing, agreed to the terms of
the settlement.31
In those instances where Section 706(b) requires deference to state
and local law, courts have consistently held that such deference is
mandatory and that an aggrieved party's failure to utilize state or local
remedies is grounds for dismissing a suit later filed under Title VII. 2
This position is consistent with the Act's legislative history which
clearly manifests the intention of Congress that state and local agencies
not be by-passed in favor of direct federal action.3
d) Who May File Charges. As noted above, Section 706(a) provides
that a charge may be filed either by a person claiming to be aggrieved
or by a Commission member.34 "Aggrieved Party" as that term is used
30. This general policy with respect to co-ordination with state agencies is set forth
in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12.
31. Id.
32. See e.g. EEOC v. Union Bank 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968); Crosslin v. Mountain
State Tel. and Tel. Co. - F. Supp. - (D.C. Ariz. August, 1969); Jefferson v. Peerless
Pumps, 71 L.R.R.M. 3158 (C.D. Calif. Jan. 15, 1969); Watts v. Douglas Aircraft Co. 70
L.R.R.M. 2907 (C.D. Calif. 1968); Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp. 282 F. Supp. 517
(C.D. Calif. 1968).
33. See, BNA, supra note 4 at 44. Sovern, supra note 4, at 83.
34. Commissioner charges are filed and thereafter processed in the same manner as
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in the statute has been held both by the Commission 35 and reviewing
courts36 to include labor unions when they are acting in their repre-
sentative capacities. The Commission has also recently taken the
position that it is unnecessary for the charging party to allege that he
has been personally victimized by the discriminatory activity set forth
in his complaint.3 7
e) Formalities of a Charge. Objections have frequently been raised
challenging the legal sufficiency of charges filed with the Commission
by private aggrieved parties. Without valid charges, quite obviously, a
necessary prerequisite to judicial enforcement is absent.
The statute itself offers very little guidance as to what constitutes
a legally sufficient charge, stating with respect to individual charges,
only that they must be "in writing and under oath." 38 The Commission,
as it has done with many of the Act's other interstices, has attempted
in its regulations to give content to the bare bones of the statute,
indicating that:
A charge is deemed filed when the Commission receives from the
person aggrieved a written statement sufficiently precise to identify
the parties and to describe generally the action or practices com-
plained of. A charge may be amended to cure technical defects
or omissions, including failure to swear to the charge, or to
clarify and amplify allegations made therein, and such amend-
ments relate back to the original filing date.
3 9
This concept of notice pleading (with respect to Title VII charges)
has received specific approval in two recent Fifth Circuit opinions.
40
The remarks of Chief Judge Brown in subscribing to the Commission's
interpretation typify the reasoning behind this liberalized approach:
For a lay-initiated proceeding it would be out of keeping with
the Act to import common law pleading niceties to this "charge",
or in turn to hog-tie the subsequent lawsuit to any such concepts.
individual complaints, except that the Commissioner initiating the charge, is subsequently
precluded from participation in the Commission's "reasonable cause" determination. See,
Air Transport Association of America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
35. General Counsel Opinion (May 6, 1966), CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcEs GUIDE,
17,302.
36. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 795 v. Planters Mfg. Co. 259 F.
Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
37. Decision of EEOC, Case No. 68-7-132E (February 17, 1969); CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRAcricEs GUIDE, 8110.
38. Section 706(a).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1966).
40. Georgia Power Company v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
Vol. 8: 1, 1969-1970
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All that is required is that it give sufficient information to enable
EEOC to see what the grievance is all about.4 1
Courts have also adopted the Commission's liberal approach to the
under oath requirement, upholding the position that the initial charge
filed with the Commission need not be under oath, as long as it is
subsequently sworn to before judicial action is undertaken.42 The
leading case on this point is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Company,43 where the Court observed that:
Basic to our view is the fact that the "under oath" requirement
relates to the administrative procedures which are conducted by
the Commission and which precede any court action. The statute
gives the Commission no enforcement powers through the adju-
dicatory process. It allows the Commission only to investigate
charges and attempt to gain compliance by informal methods of
conference, conciliation and persuasion. Enforcement of the rights
of aggrieved parties resides exclusively in the federal courts.
When the statute is thus considered, it is clear that the require-
ment for verification of charges lodged with the Commission
relates solely to the administrative rather than to the judicial
features of the statute. We believe that the provision is directory
and technical rather than mandatory and substantive. 44
Persuasive in the eyes of these courts has been the fact that the
Commission itself accepted the charges. Judge Swygert summed up
this reasoning in Choate when he stated that "if the Commission un-
dertakes to process a charge which is not under oath, we perceive no
reason why the District Court should not treat the omission of the
oath as a permissive waiver by the Commission. To deny relief under
these circumstances would be a meaningless triumph of form over
substance." 45 Again, as with the question of sufficiency of charges, the
courts, as a matter of equity, have been unwilling to close the doors
of the courthouse merely because of technical oversights on the part
of an untrained and often unschooled complainant. 46
41. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp. 400 F.2d 28, 30 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
42. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1968); Russell v.
Alpha Portland Cement Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2256 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Georgia Power v. EEOC,
295 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
43. 402 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. 402 F.2d at 358.
45. Id. at 359.
46. This rationale has been expressed in several of the recent appellate decisions. See,
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.. 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1969).
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Thus, the weight of authority at present, holds that any written
statement, accepted by the Commission within the prescribed time
limits, which sets forth enough factual essentials to indicate the nature
of the unlawful employment practice complained of, whether or not
under oath, will be considered a legally sufficient basis on which to
launch subsequent legal action.
In the case of Commissioners' charges, Section 706(a) adds the ad-
ditional requirement that such a charge "should set forth the facts
upon which it is based." Two recent District Court decisions have split
over the interpretation to be given this section. One upheld a Com-
missioner charge containing only general allegations of employment
discrimination, noting that the Courts have applied much less strin-
gent standards towards pleadings in the administrative process than
in other types of litigation,47 while the second reached the contrary
result in a case involving much the same type of conclusory pleading.48
The latter opinion held that if the requirement of setting forth the facts
on which the charge is based was to have any meaning, it must at least
require the "Commissioner to show on the face of the charge that he
possessed information which he believed to be a reasonable basis for
his initiating the charge. ' 49
This problem also occurs with respect to suits brought by the
Attorney General under Section 707 which require the complaint to
set forth, "facts pertaining to such pattern or practice." The most
recent District Court decision follows the general trend towards re-
quiring only adequate notice of the nature of the charges, allowing
defendants to determine the precise details through the discovery
process.5 0 Other decisions, however, are in conflict. 51
47. Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC 70 L.R.R.M. 2345 (N.D. Col. Jan. 14,
1969). The Court, relying on NLRB v. Fant Milling, 360 U.S. 301 (1959), held that the
function of charges within the administrative system was merely "to set in motion the
machinery of an inquiry." See, 1K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 804,
at 523 (1958). Underlying the Court's reasoning was the fact that at least one purpose of
a Commissioner's charge was to provide a way of insulating private charging parties from
respondent retaliation. Yet, the Court reasoned if a Commissioner's charge was required
to set forth specific facts and information, this purpose would be largely nullified. The
respondent, on the other hand, argued that, without specific allegations, it would be
impossible to intelligently contest evidenciary requests by the Commission or to success-
fully litigate whether a subsequent demand was relevant to the charge. (70 L.R.R.M. at
2347).
48. Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 71 L.R.R.M. 2113, (E.D. Tenn. May 5,
1969).
49. 71 L.R.R.M. at 2118.
50. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 301 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
51. United States v. H. K. Porter Co. Civil Action No. 67-363 (N.D. Ala., filed July 28,
1967); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. (E.D. Mo. 1967), (decisions not
Vol. 8: 1, 1969-1970
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
In view of the fact that 706(a) and 707 both require charges which
disclose the factual basis of the complaint, whereas no such require-
ment is placed on individual charges, the former would certainly seem
to demand the more particularization. Just how much more specific
and detailed a Commissioner's charge and Attorney General's com-
plaint must be, however, is a matter that has yet to be finally deter-
mined. Since, as a matter of practice neither have thus far been
delineated with any more precision than suits filed by private individ-
uals, nor have they satisfied more than the notice pleading require-
ments applicable to common law suits generally, the federal courts
may soon be providing further guidance on this subject.
In summary, it is evident that both the Commission and the courts
regard the formalities for a valid unfair employment practice charge
as minimal. The rationale behind this has been that the substantive
rights which the statute was designed to protect should not be sacrificed
because of procedural irregularities on the part of either the victims
seeking relief, or the Commission whose objective is to provide that
relief. It should not be forgotten, however, that respondents still
deserve sufficient indication of the charges against which they must
defend, especially if they are to intelligently assess informational de-
mands from private litigants, the Commission and the Attorney
General. Here, as elsewhere in applying the statute, the legitimate
interests of both the charging and charged parties must be reconciled.
B. Investigations
Once the Commission is in receipt of proper charges, it must then
determine whether there exists reasonable cause to believe that the
alleged violations have in fact occurred.5 2 Though the Commission
has taken the position that a finding of reasonable cause it not essential
to subsequent judicial enforcement,5 3 the courts themselves are in
disagreement as to whether charges should be dismissed where no such
finding has been made. Making a reasonable cause finding a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite would appear to be better interpretation. Like the
officially reported, holding that more than conclusionary averments are required by 707);
Contra, United States v. I.B.E.W. Local 683, 270 F. Supp. 233 (C.D. Ohio 1967); United
States v. Building & Construction Trades Council of St. Louis 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mo.
1966); United States v. Dillon Supply Co. (E.D.N.C. 1967) (not officially reported).
52. Section 706(a).
53. EEOC Legal Interpretations (General Counsel Opinion of Sept. 7, 1965), CCH
EMPLOYMENT PAcricEs GUIDE 17,251.083 (1965).
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question of whether the EEOC need be utilized at all, a reasonable
cause finding is similarly a statutorily established procedure for
screening discrimination complaints. 54 If such a determination were
to have no bearing on future judicial action, then it would be hard to
see what purpose this legislatively decreed finding would have, save
adding another delay period before the right to court enforcement
would mature. Moreover, a reasonable cause finding represents such a
minimal standard that those complaints which cannot pass this test
would seem to have little likelihood of judicial success anyway.5 5 Logic,
alone, therefore would seem to indicate that Congress intended the
investigative process to have a meaningful role in sifting out spurious
complaints at the administrative level.56 However, because of the
relatively few decisions in point thus far, a definitive answer to the
legal significance of a no cause finding must await further litigation.
a) Notice of Charges. Because of the extremely heavy volume of
charges filed with the Commission during its brief history, and because
of the lack of funds and trained personnel, charges often sit dormant
for many months before the Commission's staff are ready to com-
mence their investigations.57 During this period, the respondent as
a rule is unaware that charges have been filed against him. Usually,
the first time that he is informed of this fact is when the Commission's
investigator contacts him to arrange a time for a meeting. In the
meantime, the Commission has usually contacted the charging party
and familiarized itself with the principal facts surrounding the
charge.58
54. Green v. McDonnell- Douglas Corp. 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Missouri, 1969); Burrell
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 287 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. La. 1968); cf. Davis v. The
Boeing Co. 2 F.E.P. 62 (W.D. Wash. August 20, 1969), (finding of reasonable cause held
to be a necessary prerequisite). Contra, Aiken v. N. Y. Times 2 F.E.P. 63 (S.D.N.Y. August
4, 1969); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp. 71 L.R.R.M. 2594 (S.D. Texas June 9, 1969). cf.
Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp. 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Calif. 1968).
55. Even under the relaxed "reasonable cause" standard, a sizable percentage of cases
are dismissed by the Commission. In fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1967, for instance, "cause" find-
ings were made against respondents in only about 60 percent of the cases investigated.
(Equal Employment Opportunity Law-Practice and Procedure (Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law 1969) supra note 12, at 184).
56. A contrary view, however, is expressed by Berg in Title VII: A Three Years' View,
supra note 15, at 317, 318.
57. EEOC, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1967), Rosen, Book Review 81, HARV. L. REV. 276,
282 (1967). See also, Miller v. International Paper Co. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). At the
present time, the Commission has a backlog of 18 months. Of this period, the delay factor
before investigation begins is 4 or 5 months. See, statement of former Commission Chair-
man Clifford Alexander (68 LAB. REL. REP. 200).
58. N. PowERs, Now HEAR THIS (National Association of Manufacturers 9- Plans for
Progress), 6, (1969).
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Though the Act provides a ninety-day limitation period for filing
charges with the Commission, the statute specifies no time period
within which the Commission must serve a copy of such charges on a
respondent. One appellate court has indicated that this absence of
statutory direction is indicative that the Commission is under no time
limitation in this regard. 59 Indeed, this is the position which the EEOC
has in actual practice adopted.60 The Fifth Circuit in its Georgia Power
decision has registered less than whole-hearted endorsement of this
approach, however, suggesting that the Commission might be well-
advised to furnish the charged party with a copy of the original charge
immediately, with a notation that a formal charge will be shortly
forthcoming. 61
The statute's silence with respect to the service of charges is one
of the most glaring deficiencies in the legislation. It not only presents
serious questions of due process, but in many instances only serves to
further delay voluntary settlement. The Commission justifies this
withholding of formal charges until the time for investigation on the
grounds that this alleviates the threat of reprisals against charging
parties. 62 There appears to be no satisfactory reason, however, why
respondents cannot be notified of the charges immediately without
sacrificing the interests of those resorting to the Commission. Even if
the basic assumption that respondents' retaliation occurs frequently
enough to present a serious problem is warranted, there are feasible
alternatives which provide at least as adequate protection for charging
parties.63 The cause of justice is not served by elevating one set of rights
while suppressing others, especially when the two are not irreconcilable.
59. Local 5, IBEW v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1968). The Court likened the Com-
mission to the National Labor Relations Board and other federal agencies in this respect,
in that they are under no time limitation within which charges must be served or the
investigation commenced. Two District Courts have also reached the same conclusion.
Pullen v. Otis Elevator Co., 292 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Blue Bell Boats, Inc. v.
EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
60. Powers, supra note 58.
61. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. Remarks of Daniel Steiner, General Counsel of the EEOC, at the seminar on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law, ABA, March 28, 1969. The Commission takes the position
that the immediate service of a complaint would in many instances disclose the identity
of the charging party(ies) and subject them to possible retaliation while their complaints
await Commission action.
63. One possible solution would be to block out all reference to the names of charging
parties on the copies of the charges forwarded to the respondent. Such a complaint would
still remain a valid charge within the criteria of 706(a). See, Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969). Another solution would be to immediately advise the complain-
ants of their legal recourses should they be the victims of further discrimination. Of
course, the best solution would be to eliminate the delay and commence investigation
immediately.
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b) Demand for Production of Evidence. During the initial meeting
between the EEOC investigator and the respondent, the former will
normally either orally request certain records pertaining to the com-
pany's, union's or employment agency's operations or, as is the more
common practice, request in writing a list of specific records, data and
other information which the Commission deems pertinent. Often, these
requests are quite detailed and seek to elicit extensive information on
employment policies dating back for a number of years.
Under Section 710 the Commission is granted authority in connec-
tion with the investigation of unlawful employment practice charges
"to examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of
documentary evidence relevant or material to the charge under investi-
gation." If a respondent refuses to cooperate in supplying the Commis-
sion with the sought after information, the Commission will issue him
a formal demand letter. If the respondent still refuses to comply,
Section 710(b) of the statute requires him to petition "the Federal
District within which he resides, is found, or transacts business" within
twenty days after receipt of the demand, should he desire the demand
modified or set aside. Failure to do so on the part of a respondent
precludes him from raising any objections which he might have raised
by a timely petition.64 Thus, once a formal demand is issued, the onus
is shifted to the respondent. At this juncture he has the alternative of
challenging the demand, or continuing to resist, at the risk of waiving
objections which could have been raised within the twenty-day period,
should the Commission later seek a court order under 710(b).
Section 710, as you might suspect, has given rise to considerable
litigation thus far. Most of the objections raised against EEOC
evidenciary demands under this section have concerned the scope of
the Commission's inquiries and the relevance of the information sought
in relation to the charges under investigation. For the most part, the
Commission's demands have been upheld, 65 though in a number of
64. Overnite Transportation Co. v. EEOC, 397 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1968). In Overnite, the
respondent argued unsuccessfully that relevance was a jurisdictional criteria required by
the statute and could not be waived by the mere failure to apply for relief within the
twenty day period.
65. Typical of the leeway that the Courts have granted the Commission is the Fifth
Circuit's recent decision in Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969),
where the lower court's order granting the Commission access to information concerning
all job openings and persons hired in one of the respondent's offices over a 6 month
period, was approved. The employer, in this case, had maintained that only relevant
records were those pertaining to the "aggrieved applicant, persons hired in preference
to her and the job in question."
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instances, the courts have narrowed the breadth of their more com-
prehensive requests.1 6
In addition to challenging relevance and materiality of the informa-
tion sought, a respondent's petition under 710(b) may also contest the
underlying jurisdictional basis for the Commission's investigation.
Thus, the failure of a charging party to exhaust state remedies as re-
quired by Section 706(b), may be raised as a defense to Commission
demands, since such a failure deprives the Commission of its juris-
diction to entertain the charge.6 7 Likewise, defects in the charges filed
with the Commission and other procedural shortcomings, such as
timeliness, can be raised in conjunction with a petition to set aside
an evidenciary demand by the Commission.6" Thus, 710(b) not only
offers a method for contesting the propriety of the EEOC's evidenciary
demand, but also in certain instances provides a shortcut way of
resolving some of the difficult procedural questions implicit in Title
VII litigation, without the delay normally associated with a substantive
adjudication. This procedure should prove extremely useful for
respondent's attorneys, in that it furnishes them with a way of segregat-
ing the issues and gaining a more intelligent assessment of their client's
exposure with respect to subsequent conciliation or court action.
c) Conference, Conciliation and Persuasion. Once the Commission
has determined that "there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true," Section 706(a) of the statute states that it "shall en-
deavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." This
requirement has led to one of the most litigated of all the Title VII's
procedural debates, a debate which is now all but settled.
Many of the first courts that examined the language of 706(a), con-
cluded that conciliation on the part of the EEOC was a mandatory
requirement and hence, courts were without jurisdiction until the
Commission had at least made attempts at actual conciliation.6 9 On its
66. See, Union Bank v. EEOC, 296 F. Supp. 313 (C.D. Calif. 1967); Blue Bell Boots,
Inc. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F.
Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Local 104, Sheetmetal Workers v. EEOC, 70 L.R.R.M. 2345
(N.D. Calif. Jan. 14, 1969). cf. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Co. 46 F.R.D. 56, (S.D.
Ga. 1968), with respect to the scope of interrogatories in connection with a Title VII suit.
67. EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968).
68. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Bowaters Southern
Paper Corp. v. EEOC, - F. Supp. -, 71 L.R.R.M. 2113 (E.D. Tenn. May 5, 1969).
Contra, Blue Bell Boots v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
69. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967); Choate v.
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face, this interpretation is consonant with Section 706(e) which pro-
vides for civil action by aggrieved parties if the "Commission has been
unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title." This interpreta-
tion is also consistent with the great emphasis which the statute places
on voluntary settlement processes and also finds some support in the
statute's legislative history.70 Nonetheless, interpreting conciliation as
a jurisdictional prerequisite to court enforcement ran directly counter
to very practical policy considerations. As alluded to before, the Com-
mission was woefully understaffed, with the result that the average
length of time for the Commission to fully process a case, including
efforts at conciliation, fluctuated between eighteen months and two
years.7 1 Quite obviously, if an aggrieved party were required to await
the completion of the Commission's mediative efforts, the effectiveness
of available remedies would be largely dissipated.
Confronted with these stark realities, the overwhelming weight of
authority, including the only federal appellate decisions to rule on the
subject, now hold that efforts by the Commission to conciliate do not
constitute a necessary precondition to judicial action under Title VII.72
Technically, the courts have accomplished this result by interpreting
the word "unable" as it is used in 706(a), to mean "simply unable"
and "that a Commission prevented by lack of appropriations and
inadequate staff from attempting persuasion is just as unable to obtain
voluntary compliance as a Commission frustrated by the recalcitrance
of an employer or a union. ' '73 Philosophically, the courts' position is
probably best expressed by the oft-quoted passage from Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc.:
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 274 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ill. 1967); Evenson v. Northwest Airlines,
268 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967).
70. After extensive examination, Appellate Courts, however, have observed that the
Act's legislative history is inconclusive on this point. See, Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line
Ry., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); cert denied, sub nom: Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v.
Walker, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.
1969); Miller v. International Paper Co. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. Supra note 57. See also, Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 849 (1969).
72. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dent. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969);
Walker v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1969); IBEW v. EEOC, 398
F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum Co., 68 L.R.R.M. 2762 (W.D. Mich.
1968); Harris v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 293 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Kendrick v.
American Bakery Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2012 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Bing v. Roadway Express, 70
L.R.R.M. 3043 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Noon v. Kaiser Steel Corp. 60 CCH Lab Cas. 9313 (C.D.
Calif. Aug. 20, 1969). In the minority are Burrell v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 287 F. Supp.
289 (E.D. La. 1968); Green v. Ford Motor Co., 70 L.R.R.M. 3180 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7,
1969).
73. Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89
S. Ct. 1189 (1969).
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The Plaintiff is not responsible for the acts or omissions of the
Commission. He, and the members of his class, should not be
denied judicial relief because of circumstances over which they
have no control. The plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies
and satisfied the requirements of the Act by filing a complaint
with the Commission and awaiting its advice. He is not required
to show that the Commission had endeavored to conciliate. To
insist that he do so, would require him to pursue an administrative
remedy which may be impossible to achieve. If the Commission
makes no endeavor to conciliate, the remedy is ineffective and
inadequate.7 4
Thus, it is now well established that an effort by the EEOC to con-
ciliate an unlawful employment practice charge is not a condition
precedent to the charging party's right to later seek judicial relief.
d) Thirty Day Notice Letter. Once the Commission has finished its
investigation and completed whatever conciliation attempts it is able
to undertake, it is required under 706(e) to "so notify the person
aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be
brought against the respondent." Because of the delay factor high-
lighted above, the Commission has issued regulations under which
either "the charging party or the respondent may upon the expiration
of sixty days after the filing of the charge or at any time thereafter
demand in writing that such (thirty day) notice issue and the Com-
mission shall promptly issue such notice to all parties."7 5 The avowed
purpose of this regulation is to allow potentially fruitful conciliation
attempts to continue, while giving an individual the right to precipitate
the EEOC thirty-day letter and thereby hasten his day in court.76
The thirty-day notice referred to in the statute which triggers the
time for filing suit, has been interpreted to mean notice in writing
The fact that the Commission's conciliation efforts have failed and
such failure is known to the charging party, is insufficient to ignite
the running of the thirty-day period.7 7 Unlike a number of the statute's
other requirements, this thirty-day period has been construed as a
74. 271 F. Supp. 842, 846-47 (E.D. Va. 1967). This passage has been quoted with approval
by the Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir.
1968); the Fifth Circuit in Miller v. International Paper Company, 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1969); and cited by the Seventh Circuit in Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d
357 (1968).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.23(b).
76. See, Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
77. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Pullen v. Otis
Elevator Co., 292 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ga. 1968). cf. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
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mandatory limitation period. "Aggrieved individuals" must file civil
suit within the prescribed period, or face dismissal of their complaints"
However, where application to a Federal District Court for appoint-
ment of counsel in accordance with section 706(e) has been made within
the 30-day time period, it has been held that this requirement has been
satisfied.79
e) Overall Time Limitations. It has been argued that in addition to
the requirement that court action be brought within thirty days after
receipt of the Commission's notice, the suit must also have been initiated
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged discrimination's
occurrence. This figure is obtained by adding the initial ninety-day
statute of limitations for filing charges with the Commission, and the
thirty days for filing suit after notice, to the sixty-day period which
section 706(e) speaks of as the time within which the Commission has
to investigate and conciliate.80 Like the conciliation prerequisite argu-
ment, this contention found acceptance among some of the earlier
decisions,8' but has at present been overwhelmingly rejected, the
sixty-day period allotted by 706(e) being held to be "directory," rather
than "mandatory.' '82
Here again, the practical dictates necessitated this result. Obvi-
ously, to require the Commission to complete its functions of in-
vestigating, rendering reasonable cause decisions and conciliating,
78. Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d
357 (7th Cir. 1968); Antonopulos v. Aerojet Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Calif. 1968);
Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 F.E.P. 1 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 1969).
79. Application for counsel pursuant to section 706(e) has in two instances been held
to evidence sufficient compliance with the statute's 30 day requirement, even though the
complainant did not file suit until some time after the expiration of the 30 day period.
McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2637 (E.D. Texas June 4, 1969); Witherspoon
v. Mercury Freight Lines, 70 L.R.R.M. 2913 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
80. Section 706(e) reads in part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) (except that in either
case such period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a determination
by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are warranted),
the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the
Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty
days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . .
81. Miller v. International Paper Co., 290 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Miss. 1967); Cunningham
v. Litton Industries, 66 L.R.R.M. 2697 (C.D. Calif. 1967); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.,
251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
82. Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d
357 (7th Cir. 1968); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Calif.
1968); Pullen v. Otis Elevator Co., 292 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ga. 1968); See, Stebbins v. United
States, 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th
Cir. 1969).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
all within sixty days would be to demand the impossible. Moreover,
since Congress throughout its debates, constantly stressed the objectives
of informal conciliation, any interpretation which for all intents and
purposes would nullify this aspect of the Commission's operations,
could hardly be sustained. Hence, the more recent cases now uniformly
held that 706(e) should be read as providing neither for a gross one
hundred and eighty-day limitation period, nor a sixty-day period within
which the EEOC must act on a given charge.
Thus, the only two significant time limitations for purposes of sub-
sequent court action are: (1) the ninety-day limitation period for filing
charges after the occurrence of the alleged discrimination and (2) the
thirty-day period for filing civil suit after receipt of notice from the
Commission.
C. Judicial Enforcement
a) Mootness. Having complied with all the procedural technicalities
associated with filing a charge, and equipped with a thirty-day notice
letter from the Commission, the aggrieved party is finally eligible to
file a civil suit to obtain the "appropriate relief" which the statute
holds out to victims of employment discrimination. By this time, how-
ever, a considerable amount of time may have elapsed since the alleged
discrimination took place. In the meantime, also, the respondent may
have endeavored to rectify his wrongdoing by agreeing to take the
action which the charging party felt was his due. Assuming this to be
the case, the question then arises as to whether the respondent's efforts
at a private settlement have rendered the original complaint moot.
Several courts have considered this issue and all have concluded that
such settlement offers do not necessarily deprive a charging party of
his right to judicial relief. 83 The real test in such cases appears to be
whether the proposed action on the part of the respondent offers full
and complete relief to the complainant from the effects of the discrim-
ination. For instance, in Jenkins v. United Gas Corporation,4 it was
held that neither the offer of a promotion by a respondent nor its
acceptance by a charging party subsequent to the filing of charges,
renders a Title VII suit moot, since the question of back pay was still
83. Jenkins v. United States Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Rosen v. Public
Service Electric and Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1969). See, Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2071 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
84. 400 F.2d 28.
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litigable. Even more importantly from the standpoint of legal precedent
was the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that a suit for vindication of employ-
ment rights under Title VII is "more than a private claim by an
employee seeking a particular job." It is "perforce a sort of class action
for fellow employees similarly situated," which a "court over the
suitor's protest may not do it for him [dismiss his complaint] without
ever judicially resolving by appropriate means (summary judgment,
trial, etc.), the controverted issue of employer unlawful discrimina-
tion."8 5 Thus, for purposes of bringing suit, the court treated the
plaintiff as a "private Attorney General" representing interests other
than those peculiar to himself.86 Likewise, in Rosen v. Public Service
Electric and Gas Company,87 the Third Circuit refused to hold that
the subsequent modification of an alleged discriminatory pension plan
mooted a complaint based on the original pension agreement, since it
was possible that some harm may have inured to the charging class
before the pension plan's modification. 8
Thus, it is clear that courts will thoroughly examine the nature and
adequacy of a respondent's settlement proposal to determine whether
the charging party has been made whole. If not, the judicial process
will remain available to provide complete relief, where warranted.
Whether, assuming the adequacy of the voluntary settlement, a com-
plaint will still lie based on the inherent class nature of Title VII suits,
is a question that will likely depend largely on the liberality of the
court and its conceptual evaluation of discrimination charges generally.
b) Exhaustion of Contractual Remedies. Another defense frequently
raised to charges under Title VII, is that the charging party has failed
to exhaust contractual remedies or, if exhausted, that he is thereby
bound by the result. This defense, of course, is not endemic to equal
employment law alone, but has been raised in defense to Taft-Hartley
85. 400 F.2d at 33.
86. The term "private attorney general" was first used by the Supreme Court in
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968), a case envolving Title Il of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has since become a favorite phrase of a number of Courts
for emphasizing the public interest involved in suits claiming class discrimination. For a
discussion of the relative merits of the "public" versus "private" nature of Title VII suits,
See, e.g., Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Reme-
dies, supra note 6, at 522; Berg; Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, supra note 4; Comment, 32 U. of CHI. L. REv. 430, supra note 6.
87. See cases cited note 83 supra.
88. The Rosen decision, however, specifically disassociated itself from the remarks made
in Jenkins regarding the inherent class nature of Title VII suits and "public rights" which
such suits seek to vindicate. 409 F.2d 775, at 780 note 18.
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charges as well, 89 As we have seen, the Commission, upheld by the
courts, has held that the failure to exhaust contract grievance machinery
does not preclude an individual from seeking relief under Title VIIY0
More difficult is the question of whether an aggrieved party who has
tested the merit of his grievance under the contract and has found
it wanting, is subsequently precluded from relief, either from the
Commission or the Courts. To date, the Commission has not adopted
a policy of deference to arbitration awards, such as the Speilberg
Doctrine developed by the National Labor Relations Board,91 and will
process all charges properly before it, regardless of the existence of a
prior arbitration award dealing with the same subject matter.
The courts, however, have regarded the presence of a preexisting
arbitration award with considerably more deference. Several decisions
have held that, a party having once pursued his collective bargaining
grievance procedures to the point of conclusion, has at that point made
a binding election of remedies and is thereafter bound by the contract
resolution, to the exclusion of Title VII relief.92 In Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Company, the District Court adopted an even more restric-
tive approach, holding that there must be a strict and final election
at the outset between contractural remedies and relief under Title VII,
with a binding election being made by simply initiating the grievance
procedure under collective bargaining contract. 93 On appeal to the
Seventh Circuit, however, this holding was reversed. 94
The Court characterized the situation confronting the trial court
as "one in which there exists concurrent jurisdiction under the stat-
utory scheme and under the grievance and arbitration process for
the resolution of claims against an employer and a union." Viewed in
this light, the Court found the analogy to labor disputes involving con-
current jurisdiction of the NLRB and the arbitration process, to be not
89. The Board and the Courts have repeatedly held that failure to utilize the contract
grievance machinery does not preclude resort to the statutory remedies available under
the Act. With respect to matters previously the subject of arbitration, Speilberg Mfg. Co.
36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955), sets forth the criteria which the National Labor Relations
Board utilizes in determining whether deference should be accorded to a prior arbitration
award.
90. See cases cited note 27 supra.
91. Powers, supra note 58, at 5.
92. Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Calif. 1968);
Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Calif. 1968); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 60 LC 9307 (D.C. Pa. June 11, 1969). Contra, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. S.D. 1968).
93. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
94. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 2 F.E.P. 121 (7th Cir., Sept. 26, 1969).
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merely compelling, but "conclusive." Accordingly, they held that "it
was error not to permit the plaintiffs to utilize dual or parallel prose-
cution both in court and through arbitration so long as the election
of remedy was made after adjudication, thereby precluding duplicate
relief which would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the
plaintiffs." 95
Clearly, there is much to be said for forcing a party at some point to
make an election between available remedies. Providing a complainant
with several opportunities to prove his case, and delaying the ultimate
resolution does not serve the ends of justice, nor promote harmonious
labor relations. However, rights created by virtue of a collective bar-
gaining agreement are not necessarily coterminous with those pro-
tected by Title VII. A respondent may well be guilty of employment
discrimination under the latter, without having violated the terms
of his labor agreement.90 Whether a prior attempt at, or actual resolu-
tion through the contract machinery, will later preclude relief under
Title VII, therefore, should depend on whether the rights guaranteed
by the contract are the same as those protected by the Act and whether
the operative facts considered, are the same in both forums. If the
answer is yes to both, then, provided the Speilberg safeguards are
observed, the complainant should be deemed to have made his election
at the point where a final decision is first reached.
c) Scope of Ligitable Issues. Another defense sometimes raised at the
judicial enforcement stage is the contention that the issues which the
plaintiff/aggrieved party has attempted to assert through his civil action,
exceed the scope of the issues raised by his complaint before the Com-
mission. In King v. George Power Co.,97 the court expressly rejected
such a contention, holding instead that "the allegations contained in
[a] complaint . . . may encompass any kind of discrimination like
or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of
such allegation during the pendency of the case before the Commis-
sion."19 8 Since it is the EEOC's policy to develop not only those matters
specifically alleged in the charge, but also to ferret out during the course
95. Id. at 123.
96. This distinction was emphasized in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786
(W.D. S.D. 1968), where the Court observed that the issues which the arbitrator had
earlier dealt with, were wholly different from the ones raised in the Title VII suit. Under
these circumstances, the arbitration award was held not to preclude an action based upon
the statute rather than the collective bargaining agreement.
97. 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
98. Id. at 947.
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of the investigation any other violations of which the respondent may
be guilty, this interpretation considerably expands the issues which
an aggrieved party may raise in a subsequent court action.99 The reasons
cited by the court in justification of this policy were twofold:
(1) That an aggrieved party is often ignorant of "the full panoply
of discrimination which he may have suffered" and may be "ignorant
of or unable to throughly describe the discrimination to which they
are subjected."'100
(2) That if the range of issues that could subsequently be litigated
did not include the entire subject matter of the conciliation efforts
between the EEOC and the respondent, the statute's emphasis on volun-
tary settlement would be seriously curtailed.'0 '
This reasoning, while having merit from a policy standpoint, is
properly subject to a number of criticisms. First of all, permitting a
shot gun approach to Title VII suits removes any incentive for the
respondent to cooperate in the investigation of charges at the Com-
mission level. While many respondents would be willing to co-operate
in resolving specific allegations of discrimination, they are understand-
ably reluctant to participate in a wholesale fishing expedition without
any indication as to specific nature of the violations under investiga-
tion. This is especially true since respondents may very well later find
themselves forced to defend against these unalleged and undisclosed
violations. Certainly, no self-respecting attorney will want his client
subjected to such an inquest without greater safeguards than the Com-
mission is presently willing to grant. Furthermore, comprehensive in-
vestigations naturally lead the Commission to seek discovery beyond
that relevant to the charges under investigation, and thereby exceed
the standard established by the Act for delimiting the scope of the
Commission's discovery powers.10 2 Moreover, encouraging far ranging
and sweeping investigations only serves to delay even further the
resolution of the specific complaint which originally triggered the
Commission's intervention. Thus, the interests of the individual who
initially invoked federal assistance may be subordinated to those of
unknown, undefined and often uninterested parties whom a crusading
99. Powers, supra note 58, at 6-7.
100. 295 F. Supp. at 947.
101. Id.
102. Under section 710(a), Commission informational demands are restricted to "the
production of documentary evidence relevant or material to the charge under investiga-
tion." (Emphasis added.)
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Commission deems must be protected. Undoubtedly, there will be
further decisions delineating the scope of litigable issues, and it is hoped
these competing considerations will be given greater weight than has
previously been the case.
d) Class Action Suits. Some of the most difficult procedural questions
arising under Title VII have involved the subject of class action law-
suits. Basically, the courts have been called upon to determine whether
the mandates set forth in Title VII can be vindicated on a class, as
well as an individual basis and if so, what type of relief should be
available to individual members of the class. On the one hand, the
statute's graduated enforcement mechanisms consisting of the com-
plaint, investigation, conciliation and litigation, seemingly envision
the resolution of discrimination allegations on an individual, case by
case basis. Yet, as many courts have recognized, "it would be wasteful,
if not vain, for numerous employees all with the same grievance to
have to process many identical complaints with the EEOC."'1 3 In the
end, this latter reasoning has prevailed, provided however that certain
limitations with respect to the scope of the class, areas of litigation and
the nature of the relief are observed. 04
One of the first cases dealing with class action suits was Hall v.
Wertham Bag Corp.10 5 Here, the court concluded that as long as the
requirements for the maintenance of a class action under rule 23(a),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, °6 are met, a class suit seeking injunc-
tive relief prohibiting future discrimination would lie, even though
only one member of the class had in fact filed charges with the Com-
mission. Subsequently, however, other courts, while acknowledging
the propriety of class action suits under Title VII, held that the class
encompassed by the lawsuit, must be limited to those who had filed
103. Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
104. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Colbert v. H. K. Corp.,
295 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D.
Ga. 1968).
105. See cases cited note 81 supra.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims of defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
requirements of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (2) the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the case as a whole.
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charges with the Commission. 10 7 The recent Fifth Circuit decision in
Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp.,os goes a long way towards resolving
the above conflict in authority and is probably the leading case on the
subject of class action suits under Title VII. In Oatis, the court observed
that, permitting class actions where not all the members thereof had
utilized the assistance of the Commission would not in any way frustrate
the purposes of the Act, since "if it is impossible to reach a settlement
with one discriminatee, what reasons would there be to assume the next
one would be successful.' 0 9 Why should complainants be forced to
undertake administrative relief which has already proven itself un-
availing, they reasoned. The better approach, in their eyes, would be
that, "once an aggrieved person raises a particular issue with the EEOC
which he has standing to raise, he may bring an action for himself and
the class of persons similarly situated."" 0 The court then went on to
lay down the following guidelines:
We thus hold that a class action is permissible under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 within the following limits. First,
the class action must, as it does here, meet the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and (b). Next, the issues that may be raised by plaintiff
in such a class action are those issues that he has standing to raise
(i.e., the issues as to which he is aggrieved, see § 706(a), supra), and
that he has raised in the charges filed with the EEOC pursuant to
§ 706(a).... Additionally, it is not necessary that members of the
class bring a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to joining as
co-plaintiffs in the litigation. It is sufficient that they are in a class
and assert the same or some of the issues .... They, as co-plaintiffs,
must proceed however, within the periphery of the issues which
Hill could assert. .... 1
These last two caveats appear to be the most troublesome. Whether
a given charging party is sufficiently representative of the group for
whom the class suit is filed and has asserted issues applicable to the
entirety of the class are questions that must be resolved on a case by
case basis. Thus far, a number of courts have refused to allow an
applicant for employment or a dischargee to represent a class em-
107. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967);
Mondy v. Crown Zellerback, 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1966); Miller v. International Paper
Co., 290 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
108. Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
109. 398 F.2d at 498,
110. Id.
111. 398 F.2d at 499.
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bodying present employees, or vice versa.11 2 Also proving troublesome
is the other Oatis requirement, that the litigable issues must be
"within the periphery of the issues which the charging party could
assert."11 3 A number of courts have and are presently grappling with
determinations of this nature.
In Hall v. Wertham Bag Corp., supra, the court restricted remedial
assistance for the class to injunctive relief, denying the request for the
ancillary relief or reinstatement and back pay. Noting that the Com-
mission had not been given an opportunity to conciliate each of the
individual claims, the Court held that the purpose of the administra-
tive remedy requirement had not been satisfied. Particularized relief,
therefore, under this reasoning should be confined to those who have
utilized the Commission to rectify the wrongs allegedly committed
against them, and not formulated by a court in a comprehensive pro-
ceeding. This position has received approval from a number of courts,1 4
though the Seventh Circuit in Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive and two
recent District Court decisions have now ruled otherwise. In Bowe,
the Court stated that it could perceive no justification for granting
injunctive relief in class action suits, while denying other forms
of relief. The purpose of the charge filing requirement is to pro-
vide for notice to the charged party and to bring to bear the
voluntary compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC, and
the Court observed that this purpose is fulfilled when a charge is filed
asserting grievances common to the class. Hence, in their estimation,
there was no reason why in class action suits under Title VII, the class,
including any and all members thereof, should be denied any form
of relief to which they may be entitled. In conclusion, the Court felt
that "the clear purpose of Title VII is to bring an end to the prescribed
discrimination practices and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion,
those who have suffered by it."' ra In Local 186 v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co." 6 the Court, relying on Oatis and several other recent Fifth
Circuit cases, concluded that the public interest "should be served
112. See, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 70 L.R.R.M. 2664 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
Russell v. Alpha Portland Cement Corp. 69 L.R.R.M. 2256 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Hogan v.
Capital Fish Co. 70 L.R.R.M. 3295 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 1969). cf. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Refining Co. 46 F.R.D. 56 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
113. 398 F.2d at 499.
114. Williams v. American Saint Gobain Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2325 (E.D. Okla. 1968);
Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
115. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 2 F.E.P. 121, at 126.
116. 71 L.R.R.M. 2427 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 1969).
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just as much, if not more, by relief through awards for back wages and
reinstatement to obscure class members as by the issuance of an injunc-
tion. ' ' 117 Likewise, in Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co.,"18 it was held that
all class members, since they had the same basis and standing as the
original plaintiff, were entitled to the same type of relief, including
reinstatement or hiring as new employees, with or without back pay,
within the Court's discretion. As the reader can see, this is another of
the many procedural questions which must await further clarification
at the appellate level.
Thus, the concept of class action suits under Title VII is now well
established, though the emphasis and scope of such litigation must yet
be brought into sharper focus.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing indicates, most of the more controversial procedural
questions have now been litigated. As a result, many of the technical re-
quirements associated with Title VII actions, which had earlier proved
stumbling blocks to court enforcement, have now been removed.
Moreover, through this process of "elucidating litigation," even the
answers to the remaining procedural questions have been largely
foreshadowed. Avowedly, the federal courts in general, and the appellate
courts in particular have made it abundantly clear that they will not
permit technical, procedural aspects of the statute to victimize the very
persons whom its substantive provisions were designed to protect.
Thus, with only minor exceptions, the courts have adopted a per-
missive attitude toward Title VII's formal requirements, holding most
of the limitations expressed in the statute to be "directory" rather than
"mandatory." Consequently, the incidence of dismissals, non-suits and
summary judgments stemming from the failure of complainants or the
Commission to comply with the Act's legal technicalities have sharply
declined. Furthermore, by virtue of the Commission's regulation allow-
ing either party to request the dispatching of the "30-day letter" after
the complaint has been with the Commission for 60 days, "aggrieved
parties" are now afforded an expedited method for obtaining judicial
relief. This combination of relaxed preliminary prerequisites and
expedited court action, should serve to streamline the prosecution of
117. 71 L.R.R.M. at 2435.
118. 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9304 (N.D. Miss. August 13, 1969).
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"unequal employment opportunity complaints" through the Commis-
sion stage and onto the judicial level. Victims of employment discrimina-
tion need no longer wait for the processes of an understaffed and over-
loaded Commission to run their course in order to file suit, and once
in court, they need have less fear of having their case dismissed because
of technical shortcomings. Clearly, facilitation of judicial relief under
Title VII is now the hallmark of decided case law.
In spite of this liberalizing trend, however, meaningful and effective
relief for both individuals and minority groups as such under Title VII
is still a long process. Predictably, conciliation has proven a less than
satisfactory answer. Even where the Commission's role is confined to a
minimum, pursuing court action can be a lengthy, time consuming and
expensive process. The end result, therefore, even assuming an ag-
grieved party opportunely avails himself of judicial means of enforce-
ment, is that "appropriate relief" is often years away. In the meantime,
the effects of employment discrimination continue to make themselves
felt in the day to day lives of those affected.
In recognition of the injustices caused by excessive delay, two bills
stressing speedier and more effective remedial action have recently
been introduced and are presently pending before Congress.119 It may
well be that their disposition will mark the second phase in the "epic
legislative struggle" for civil rights in employment. The success of
these proposals should not be assumed, however. Judging from the Con-
gressional reception accorded Title VII, both before and after passage,
and from Congress's reaction to subsequent efforts at amendment, it
is not altogether promising that these new measures will fare any better
than their predecessors. 120 Even were a substantial alteration in the
119. The most recent of the many bills that would alter the present system of Title VII
enforcement is (S-2806), introduced August 8, 1969, as the Nixon administration's proposalfor improving the effectiveness of the present law. Also pending before the 91st Congress is(S-2453), introduced June 19, 1969, by Senator Williams (D-N.J.), Chairman of the Labor
Subcommittee of the Senate Labor Committee, and several other Senators. Basically, the
two bills differ in that (S-2806) would authorize the Commission itself to institute suit inFederal District Courts to remedy Equal Employment Opportunity violations, while(S-2453) would empower the Commission to issue cease and desist orders enforceable
through resort to the Federal Appellate Courts, similar to the present enforcement pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Board. Numerous attempts had been made pre-
viously to the 91st Congress to amend Title VII so as to put more teeth in its enforcementprovisions. Most of these proposals have been structured along the lines of (S-2453) and
all have, thus far, failed to gain passage.
120. Since its passage in 1964, there have been numerous attempts on the part of Con-gress to strengthen Title VII's enforcement powers. The House passed the Hawkins Bill(H.R. 10065) on April 27, 1966, which would have given the EEOC cease and desist powerslike those contained in the present (S-2453), but the Senate failed to act on the measure. In
April, 1968, the Senate Labor Committee reported out a similar bill, (S-3465) but no
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Act's present enforcement scheme to gain the force of law, the pro-
cedural hasselings that have occupied so much of the attention of
federal courts in Title VII cases, would not necessarily have been
expended in vain. In resolving these technical issues on a case by case
basis, the federal courts have made irrefutably clear their preference
for dealing with the underlying substantive issues in equal employment
disputes, wherever possible. There is certainly no reason to suspect
that this basically pragmatic philosophy on the part of the federal
judiciary will change with the passage of new legislation. Consequently,
if Title VII litigation thus far is any indication, aggrieved parties will
continue to find judicial relief increasingly more accessible, regardless
of the precise nature of the enforcement machinery at their disposal.
further action was taken. Other bills designed to improve the effectiveness of Title VII
enforcement have also met similar fates (S-2029, H.R. 6228, and H.R. 6229).
